have occupied in occidental, and to a lesser extent, oriental histories. However, unique is the group (institution) and rare is the individual for whom the serious nature of the issue has been apparent. Yet rarer still, are those who have burdened themselves with the necessary and due level of contemplation that Jewish thought deserved as well as required in order to derive meaningful results.

In our time, those who affix the title of Jewish thinker to their name or have had others do so, are usually little more than modern ideologues applying foreign ideologies where there belong Jewish ideas. On the other side of the spectrum, there are those for whom Jewish thought consists in the memorization of the historically (traditional) Jewish texts and the mimicry of thought patterns of previous generations. Generations, one must add, that have brought the Jewish people and Jewish thought to the verge of collapse. It is abundantly clear that both are products of incomplete and distorted understandings. Two thousand years of Diasporic life have stunted and perverted the reasoning behind and definition of Jewish thought in both of these dominant schools.

Concerted and intense intellectual labor must be applied toward the most pressing and immediate exigency of the Jewish nation. Unification of Jewish thought, clarification of purposes of the Jewish people, and the meaning of the Land of Israel need, with all alacrity, to arrest Jewish senses and consume Jewish thought. The Jewish people must understand these elements as the fundamental concepts forming the Torah Idea of the Nation of Israel. Without any one of these three components, the Torah Idea of the Nation of Israel as a meaningful end is simply without worth and is indeed false. We must view the Land of Israel as fundamental to the purposes of Jewish existence, as well as for the edification of both the Jews in the Land of Israel and those in the Diaspora of the Judaic principles that will ensure the proper understanding of Jewish statecraft and existence. The purpose of this endeavor must be to promote the infusion of an agenda into Jewish discourse, which as its object seeks the consolidation of Jewish thought within the classical context.

Be it maintained that the Jewish people is a National-Religious people whose fulfillment of purpose rests in the reclamation of Eretz Yisrael and in the Jewish institutions that govern it. Unique among the nations, only the Jewish people is a people for whom it is a religious and national obligation to establish an independent polity. As important to the physical reclamation of the land is the physical return of the Jewish people to the biblically promised lands of our forefathers. It is certain that this position, wholly understood in all its significance, is not within the realm of current public discourse.

Thinking Jews need have as their agenda the construction of such a nation whose faith rests in G-d and whose path is Torah. In every generation decisions must be made and crossroads passed. In our time the Jewish people is blessed in that it possesses the building block upon which to proceed. We must make ours that generation which is confident of the reality and truth of Divine Providence. With this knowledge, the only failure is the refusal to act, and the lack of faith that accompanies it. The test of each individual is in the actions he takes, not the momentary success or apparent failure of the endeavor.

Know that it is the obligation of all men, and in particular the Jew, to strive for knowledge of the truth and to act accordingly. Within reach is the restoration of the Jewish nation as conceived by our Sages. The Jewish people have only to possess the will in order to witness the fruition of a true Jewish nation whose in-gathering is complete and whose support of the Jewish community is unyielding and resolute. Know that G-d has promised the Jewish people the Land of Israel as the physical homeland for its national existence. Know also that there can be no other reasons for the establishment of a Jewish State other than for it to represent the totality of Torah thought and observance. Put more succinctly, the only viable Jewish state is a state in which Jews behave as Jews: that the law of the land is the Law of the Jews. There is no other way for one to justify the need for an independent Jewish polity.

There have been many arguments along this line and, of course, there are many opinions on this subject. Yet, the one thing that cannot be denied is the time-transcending idea, as well as the reality, of the existence of the Jewish people. No doubt that every people wants to live and prosper; however, the distinction for the Jewish people is clear -- there is no need for the Jewish existence if it is not for the aims served. These objectives are not within the realm of the mundane -- they are, indeed, among the most sublime and holy of all possible human ends.
 
 
For purposes of clarity and source reference, it is required that authoritative Jewish texts be summoned to demonstrate the position stated above. To begin this exploration, the topic of a Jewish homeland and its natural consequence, a Jewish polity, are to be examined.

The Rambam (Maimonides) writes:

It is forbidden at all times to leave Eretz Yisrael for the Diaspora except: to study Torah; to marry; or to save [one's property] from the gentiles [lit. the worshippers of the stars and signs]. [After accomplishing these ends,] one must return to Eretz Yisrael.
Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 9.1

Maimonides continues in the same halakha:

Similarly, one may leave Eretz Yisrael to do business. However, it is forbidden [to leave with the intent] of settling permanently in the Diaspora unless the famine in [the land] is so severe that a dinar's worth of wheat is sold at two dinars. When do these conditions apply? When one possesses financial resources and food is expensive. However, if food is inexpensive, but a person cannot find financial resources or employment and has no money available, he may leave and go to any place where he can find relief. Although it is permitted to leave [Eretz Yisrael] under these circumstances, it is not pious behavior. Behold, Mahlon and Kilyon were two of the great men of the generation [of Ruth] and they left [Eretz Yisrael] only out of great distress. Nevertheless, they were considered by G-d to be worthy of death.2

Source for Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 9:

Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra, 91a, Our Rabbis taught: It is not permitted to go forth from the Land of Israel to a foreign country unless two se'ahs are sold for one sela'. R. Shimon said: [This is permitted only] when one cannot find [anything] to buy, but when one is able [to find something] to buy, even if a se'ah cost a sela' one must not depart. And so said R. Shimon b. Yohai: Elimelekh, Mahlon and Kilyon were [of the] great men of their generation, and they were [also] leaders of their generation. Why, then, were they punished? Because they left Eretz Yisrael for a foreign country; for it is written, And all the city was astir concerning them, and the women said: Is this Naomi? What [is meant by] 'is this Naomi?' -- R. Yitzhak said: They said, 'Did you see what befell Naomi who left Eretz Yisrael for a foreign country?'

Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra, 91a, R. Hanan b. Raba said in the name of Rav: Elimelekh and Salmon and Peloni Almoni and the father of Naomi all were sons of Nahshon, the son of Aminadav [Sh'mot 5:23]. What does he come to teach us [by this statement]? -- That even the merit of one's ancestors is of no avail when one leaves the Land for a foreign country.

Rational thought dictates that a man not leave his household in most circumstances and especially in times of difficulty. At the moment in which desperation is at hand, the virtuous display fortitude, strength and most of all presence. The act of leaving, to be conceived of as moral, would require great benefit for the whole of the family and its purposes. When the nation of Israel is understood as the obligation of all its members it is easier to make the comparison to a family and household. As to the reverence placed upon the meaning of holiness ascribed to the Land is, of course, parabolic and intended to draw our attention to the overall significance of Eretz Israel to the purposes of the Jewish people. Without the Land the polity could not exist. Just as without a dwelling place a family is but more individuals in a group, not significant or unique in their identity or culture, mores or habits. A very often quoted reference to this idea is the following halakha.

Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 10.

Great Sages would kiss the borders of Eretz Yisrael, kiss its stones, and roll in its dust. Similarly, it says: Behold, your servants hold her stones dear and cherish her dust. [Tehillim 102:15]3

Source for Halakha 10:

Talmud Bavli, Ketuvot, 112a, R. Hisda stated: What [was meant] by the Scriptural text, I give thee a pleasant land, the heritage of the deer? Why was the Land of Israel compared to a deer? -- To tell that as the skin of a deer cannot contain its flesh so cannot the Land of Israel contain its produce. Another explanation: As the deer is the swiftest among the animals so is the Land of Israel the swiftest of all lands in the ripening of its fruit. If [one should suggest that] as the deer is swift but his flesh is not fat so is the Land of Israel swift to ripen but its fruits are not rich, it was explicitly stated in Scripture, Flowing with milk and honey [thus indicating that they are] richer than milk and honey.

When R. Zera went up to the Land of Israel and could not find a ferry wherein to cross [a certain river] he grasped a rope bridge and crossed. Thereupon a certain Sadducee sneered at him: 'Hasty people, that put your mouths before your ears [Na'ase V'nishma' -- Sh'mot 24:7], you are still, as ever, clinging to your hastiness.' 'The spot,' the former replied, 'which Moshe and Aharon were not worthy [of entering], who could assure me that I should be worthy?' R. Abba used to kiss the cliffs of Acco. R. Hannina used to repair its obstacles. R. Ammi and R. Assi used to rise [from their seats to move] from the sun to the shade and from to the shade to the sun. R. Hiyya b. Gamda rolled himself in its dust, for it is said in the Scripture, For Thy servants take pleasure in her stones, and love her dust. [Tehillim 102:15]

The parabolic reference to the Land is very clear. The reason for the Land is its existence as place, not just any place, but the place in which revelation is to be actualized. The meaning of the deer and of the milk and honey becomes obvious when understood as it was intended by the Sages. That is, as the place in which the maturation of the true polity is possible only through the use of the laws that instruct the taking of the Land in the first place. The polity dictated by the law exceeds the otherwise and commonly accepted use of the Land. The concepts as articulated by the authentic Jewish polity once actualized indeed exceed the physical borders of the Land and have universal consequences.

A Jew who dwells in the Land ultimately is a reference to the Jew that not only subsists in Eretz Israel, but lives according to the statues defining life in the Land. Therefore, even one who transgresses is afforded forgiveness within the scope of the law of the Jewish polity. It is the system of law that gives definition to habitation in the Land and as a consequence, meaning to the Land. The halakha relating to this issue is the following.

Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 11.

The Sages said: The transgressions of one who dwells in Eretz Yisrael are forgiven, as it says: The inhabitant shall not say, 'I am sick.' The people who dwell there shall be forgiven for their transgressions. [Isaiah 33:24]

Even one who walks four cubits there will merit the World to Come and one who is buried there receives atonement as though the place in which he is were an altar of atonement, as it says: His land will atone for his people. [D'varim 32:43] [In contrast, the prophet, Amos [Amos 7:17], used the expression] You shall die in an impure land -- a prophecy of retribution.

There is no comparison between [the merit of] a person who lives in Eretz Yisrael and one brought there after death [for burial]. Nevertheless, great Sages would bring their dead there. Take an example from our Fathers, Ya'akov and Yosef, the righteous.

Source for Halakha 11:

Talmud Bavli, Ketuvot, 111a, R. Eleazar said: Whoever is domiciled in the Land of Israel lives without transgression, for it is said in Scripture, And the inhabitants shall not say, 'I am sick'; the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity. [Isaiah 33:24] Said Raba to Rav Ashi: we apply this to those who suffer from disease.

R. Anan said: Whosoever is buried in the Land of Israel is deemed to be buried under the altar; since in the latter it is written in Scripture, An altar of earth shalt thou make for me, [Sh'mot 20:21] and in respect to the former it is written in Scripture, And his land doth make expiation for his people. [D'varim 32:43]

. . . And the spirit to walk therein [Isaiah 42:5], of it, said R. Yirmeyahu b. Abba in the name of R. Yohanan, that whoever walks four cubits in the Land of Israel is assured a place in the World to Come.

As a participant in the making of the Jewish polity, the individual Jew has assumed upon himself certain fundamental understandings of self and nation. Within this context is the presupposition of revelation as true (i.e., the laws of the Torah transcend time and that human nature remains constant). The notion of Torah as a time transcending document is exhibited in the previous halakhot while the idea of unchanging human nature is first addressed with the halakha that follows and secondly discussed in the following subsection of this work.

Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 12.

At all times, a person should dwell in Eretz Yisrael, even in a city whose population is primarily of worshippers of idols, rather than dwell in the Diaspora in a city whose population is primarily Jewish.

In that all who leave [the land] for the Diaspora is as though he worships idols, as it is says: They have driven me out today from dwelling in the heritage of G-d, saying, 'Go serve other gods.' [Shmuel I 26:19] Similarly, [Ezekiel's (13:9) prophecies of] retribution state: They shall not come to the Land of Israel.

Just as it is forbidden to leave the Land for the Diaspora, so it is forbidden to leave Bavel for other lands, as it is written: They shall be brought to Bavel and there they shall be [until I take notice of them . . . and restore them to this place, i.e. the Land of Israel]. [Jeremiah 27:22]5

Source Halakha 12:

Talmud Bavli, Ketuvot, 110b, Our Rabbis taught: One should always live in the Land of Israel, even in a town most of whose inhabitants are idolaters, but let no one live outside the Land, in a town most of whose inhabitants are Israelites; for whoever lives in the Land of Israel may be considered to have a G-d, but whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who has no G-d. For it is said in Scripture, To give you the Land of Canaan, to be your G-d. [Vayikra 25:38] Has he, then, who does not live in the Land, have no G-d? But [this is what the text intended] to tell you, that whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who worships idols. Similarly it was said in Scripture in [the story of] David, For they have driven me out this day that I should not cleave to the inheritance of the L-rd, saying: Go, serve other gods. [Shmuel I 26:9] Now, whoever said to David, 'Serve other gods'? But [the text intended] to tell you that whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who worships idols. [Tosafot,'Avoda Zara, 5]

The Jew living outside the Land, constitutes the worshipping of idols because doing so denies the foundations of the Torah, i.e., the enactment of the Torah, and the living by the statutes of the Law. The project of enacting the Torah can only be legally accomplished in the Land as defined by the Law. The goal of Jewish practice is a single idea that can be dissected into three interrelated and independent subsections. The single idea is to know G-d, that is, to love G-d since the limits of human knowledge subject man's knowing of G-d to the loving of Him. Subsection one of the idea deals with individual development; subsection two, with national development; and subsection three impacts upon universal development of mankind. Each subsection is dependent on the precepts of the Law, for it is the Law that elucidates these subsections and places definitional perimeters of their understanding. Development of self begins with adherence to all commandments which, in turn, lead to the national responsibility and finally its universal ramifications. Again, it is the participation in the project and what that participation says about the belief in the endeavor itself that is so central. There is such a notion in Jewish law because the foundation of Jewish practice is founded upon the creation of an autonomous Jewish political entity in the Land of Israel. At certain points in Jewish study the simplicity of this idea is overwhelming.

 

Defining a Nation

Many important notions can be distilled from the halakhot cited above. Before any such additional discussion ensues, it is relevant to introduce yet another halakha that on the surface might appear as a different topic altogether, yet is quite meaningful and appropriate to the subject at hand and deals directly with the final thoughts of the preceding section.

The Rambam states in Yad Hazaka, Sefer HaMada' Hilkhot De'ot, (1:5) the following:

It is natural for a man's character and actions to be influenced by his friends and associates and for him to follow the local norms of behavior. Therefore, he should associate with the righteous and be constantly in the company of the wise, so that as to learn from their deeds. Conversely, he should keep away from the wicked who walk in darkness, so as not to learn from their deeds.

Solomon said: He who walks with the wise will become wise, while one who associates with fools will suffer. [Mishle 13:20] And it is said: Happy is the man who has not followed the advice of the wicked. [Tehillim 1:1]

A person who lives in a place where the norms of behavior are evil and the inhabitants do not follow the straight path should move to a place where the people are righteous and follow the ways of the good.

If all the places with which he is familiar and of which he hears reports follow improper paths, as in our times, or if he is unable to move to a place where the patterns of behavior are proper, because of gangs of raiding troops, or for health reasons, he should remain alone in seclusion as it states: Let him sit alone and be silent. [Eikha 3:28]

If they are wicked and sinful and do not allow him to reside there unless he mingle with them and follow their evil behavior, he should go out to caves, thickets, and deserts so as not to follow the paths of sinners as it says: Who will give me a lodging place for wayfarers, in the desert. [Jeremiah 9:1]

How is it that, on the one hand, the company a man keeps determines his character and standing, and yet, on the other hand, a Jew should dwell in the Land of Israel even in a place where the majority of the inhabitants are idol worshippers? Is there significance to the halakha from De'ot vis-a-vis the halakha from Melakhim to remain in Eretz Yisrael? The answer to the latter question is that all the halakhot interact and combine in such a way as to accurately reflect the Law of Torah. In this regard, as well as in numerous others, there has been no greater Jewish thinker than Maimonides. He maintains that man's soul is all too easily influenced and, unfortunately, it is routinely for the bad. The most sound and legitimate method of promoting a "healthy" soul is through first understanding this concept and then through human example [see Shemona Perakim]. That is to say, a man ought to conclude what is wise and pious behavior from Biblical or post-Biblical figures, and then he should surround himself with wise and pious men. A society, however, should establish itself to promote and then to maintain such an idea in the abstract; and the atmosphere, in reality. Given the understanding of human nature within the Jewish, as well as the classical, context this method is the only way to perpetuate certain values within a society. A society whose purpose it is to transmit these ideas to its citizenry. As a result, an inescapably important aspect of nationhood is the clarification and the rational establishment of the humanly attainable. Know that this is a premise of Torah and a truth of man in the physical world. If this nation is properly understood, much of the first question is answered. What mitigating circumstances exist for Maimonides that he might negate the need for a man to surround himself with righteous and wise men? This is the overriding importance of the national existence of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. In addition to this demonstrable notion regarding the Jewish national existence, it is the Law. Needless to say, were all Jews to adhere to the halakha of dwelling in the Land and of participating in the Jewish polity; no Jew would need to live in a place inhabited mostly by idol worshippers in the Land of Israel, rather than in a place outside the Land inhabited mostly by Jews.

It is clear from what the Rambam writes that the traditional view of the role of the Land of Israel to the practice of the Jewish religion is fundamental. An independent Jewish polity is the cornerstone on which the very concept of Judaism is built. That Torah is conceived as Law and that the fabric of Jewish life is actualized within that Law, emphatically denote that the achievement of this goal translates into the existence of a national entity. This national existence, however, is exercised exclusively as outlined in the covenant between the Jewish people and G-d. The Rambam has made explicit that which runs silently through every page of Tanakh. The entire Jewish Bible has as its premise the national and religious conception of the Jewish people. What this means in practical terms is not at all simple nor is it apparent. A national existence denotes a unified set of laws, common goals and aspirations, and the combined will of the population to bring to life that which is set forth on paper or conceived in the mind's eye.

Let it be said again that the Jewish people have today a unique opportunity. Am Yisrael has before it the path that can either lead it to the fulfillment of the 3500 year idea, that of doing the will of G-d, or the path that leads nowhere. The path that leads nowhere is not simply a euphemism for a journey into the unknown, but rather it is a description of the road that destroys, day by day, what is, within the human context, the understanding of G-d. The definition of the desecration of G-d's name is found on this path, the wrong path. By following the latter path the Jewish people not only creates the Hillul Hashem [desecration of G-d's name], but it exhibits disdain for the memory of each and every past generation that sought out the truth of human existence and martyred themselves for the idea of Torah. What can the Jewish people possibly know of itself other than its own purpose through revelation? We cannot escape what is our obligation. We have no right to reject that with which G-d has blessed us. It is time that Jews act as Jews by coming to grips with that which is their obligation, Torah Judaism.
 
 

The Uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael

The Rambam states in Yad Hazaka, Sefer 'Avoda, Hilkhot Beit HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 12, the following:The entire land of Eretz Yisrael is more sanctified than all other lands. How is its holiness expressed? The Omer offering, the two loaves [of Shavuot], and the first fruits must be brought from its [territory] and cannot be brought from other lands.7

Thus, the holiness of the Land is in the using of the Land as outlined by Torah law. There is no intrinsic holiness to the soil of Eretz Israel. The holiness of the Land is attained through the proper use of the Land and attached to the Land by the precepts of the Land. Those precepts are integral to all Torah and by logical extension all commandments rest upon the Laws of the Land.

In Hilkhot Beit HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 13 it is stated:Eretz Yisrael has ten gradations of holiness, each higher than the preceding level. The cities that are surrounded by a wall are holier than the rest of the Land.8

This reaches the heart of the matter. The Jewish people is to establish an order, a civil society, if you will, that G-d has ordained. The fact that the walled city has greater holiness than the unwalled city is for the simple reason that it is the walled city that best exemplifies the established order, that is to say, the working city. The walled city was the fortified encampment of permanence and defense for its inhabitants; the walled city is the civilized city. Whereas the unwalled city was in ever-present danger of destruction and hence lacked the substance possessed by the walled city and thereby its purpose and/or sanctity. All human existence should be founded upon the striving for man's end. The Jewish conception of this idea, similar to the classical philosophical notion, rests in the formation of a political entity that seeks purpose as part and parcel of its national life. Judaism is the blueprint for this idea. The Torah is the divine guide to the individual as well as to the nation. There can be no Jewish life by definition without this knowledge. The secularist cannot call the state he wishes to create a Jewish state nor can the religious call their existence outside of the political entity Jewish. They are both wrong and they have both missed the fundamental idea of Torah Judaism. They have failed to heed the words of the Torah, of the Sages and of the Rambam. They have failed to realize first, that an end must exist, and second, that the end must be met, within the confines of human existence, at all costs. Our Sages understood what the Rambam so clearly articulated in his work. They understood that the need for unified Jewish thought within the autonomous Jewish polity was the essence of Torah and was the only method of achieving that which G-d has chosen.

Levels of holiness detail the importance of the thing or idea under discussion. With ascending levels of holiness are attached greater reverence and awe to alert the individual as well as the nation to the significance of the object. It is therefore important to take careful note of what is meant in the following halakha.

Rambam writes in Hilkhot Beit HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 14:

Jerusalem is holier than all other walled cities. We must eat the sacrifices of lesser sanctity and the second tithes within its walls. The following restrictions were enacted in regard to Jerusalem: No corpse is left within it overnight. Human bones cannot be transported within it. Homes cannot be rented within it. A resident alien may not be given the opportunity to settle in the city. No graves may remain within it except for the graves of the House of David and the grave of Huldah, the prophetess, which were there from the days of the first prophets. We should not plant gardens or orchards within the city. It cannot be sowed or plowed, so that it will not smell foul. No trees may be maintained in it, except for a rose garden which was there from the days of the first prophets. We may not maintain a garbage dump there, because of creeping animals. We may not have balconies or protrusions extending into the public domain because of Tum'at Ohel. We may not create furnaces within it because of the smoke.

We may not raise chickens within it, because they may cause ritually pure articles [to become impure]. Just as a Kohen may not raise chickens throughout Eretz Yisrael, because they may cause ritually pure articles [to become impure].

A house in the city which is sold is never designated as the permanent property of the buyer.

A house in the city is never designated as leprous. It cannot be judged as an apostate city.

An Egla Arufa is never brought from it.

[The last four apply] because [Jerusalem] was never divided among the tribes.9

The capital of the nation is to be held in greater esteem than all other cities for it is from there that political authority is to emanate. The next several halakhot that immediately follow the one cited above describe the increasing levels of holiness found in the parts of the Beit HaMikdash. The discussion culminates in Perek 8 with the laws of caring for and guarding the Beit HaMikdash. The center of Jewish life is articulated so eloquently by Maimonides in his writing of the law for it is within the walls of the Beit HaMikdash. that, inter alia, the Sanhedrin sits. That is to say, the meaning of a Jewish commonwealth is ultimately found in the relevance of the Beit HaMikdash. Know that this concept is very sublime and requires great care and study to understand. 

For a contemporary discussion of the entire question of the value placed upon living in the Land and then the need, from a Torah perspective, of a Jewish commonwealth let us examine the words of Rabbi J. David Bleich, a Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshiva University and author of works on halakhic questions. Rabbi Bleich in discussing the halakhic ramifications of settling in Eretz Yisrael, which ultimately leads to the meaning of national existence, as he views it, discusses five positions outlined by former Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, in a paper contributed to the 5729 issue of Torah She-be'al Peh. According to Rabbi Bleich, Rabbi Yosef states the following:

Position 1

The Ramban (Nachmanides) states that it is a positive mitzva to dwell in Eretz Yisrael from his commentary on, And you shall inherit the land and dwell therein. [Bamidbar 33:53] In addition to the positive commandment to live in the Land, the Ramban prohibits Jewry from establishing national settlements outside Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban's position is repeated in his commentary of the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvot.

In Contemporary Halakhic Problems Volume I, Rabbi Bleich writes:

Further evidence that residence in Israel constitutes fulfillment of a mitzva in our day as well may be gleaned from various halakhic provisions which are apparently predicated upon this rationale. Examples cited by Rabbi Yosef include permission to allow a gentile to draw up a bill of sale on the Sabbath on behalf of a Jew acquiring property in Eretz Yisrael from a non-Jew (Gittin 8b) and the obligation of one renting a dwelling in the Land of Israel to affix a mezuza immediately upon taking up residence rather than thirty days thereafter as in the Diaspora (Menahot 44a). R. Joseph Karo in Beit Yosef, Yore De'a 286, explains that in the Diaspora a new residence is not considered to be a permanent dwelling place prior to the thirtieth day, whereas in Israel a new home is immediately deemed to be a permanent domicile because the act of residing therein constitutes the fulfillment of a mitzva and hence acquires the characteristic of permanence.

Further elucidation of this can be found in the sources:

Talmud Bavli, Gittin 8b, says:

[Our authority further says that] 'a field bought in Syria is like one bought on the outskirts of Jerusalem.' What rule of conduct can be based on this? R. Sheshet says: It means that a contract for selling it [to a Jew] can be drawn up even on Shabbat. What? On Shabbat? -- You know the dicta of Raba, 'He tells a non-Jew to do it.' So here, he tells a non-Jew to draw up the contract. And although there is a Rabbinical prohibition against telling a non-Jew to do things on Shabbat [which we may not do ourselves], where it was a question of furthering the [Jewish] settlement of Eretz Yisrael the Rabbis did not apply the prohibition.

Talmud Bavli, Menahot 44a, says:

R. Yehuda said: A borrowed garment is exempt from tzitzit for the first thirty days, thereafter it is subject to it. So, too, it was taught in a Baraita: He who stays at an inn in the Land of Israel or who rents a house outside the Land is, for the first thirty days, exempt from mezuza, thereafter he is subject to it. But he who rents a house within the Land of Israel is bound to affix a mezuza forthwith, in order to maintain the settlement in the Land of Israel.

The meaning of Talmud Bavli, Gittin 8b is that acquiring parts of the Land of Israel takes president over the restrictions of the Sabbath observance. As with the example of the affixing of a mezuza upon a doorpost, for a Jew to inhabit the Land of Israel is a clear commandment dictated by the Torah. It is the ramifications of this commandment and the meaning to be taken from the commandment that has become blurred with the distortions of diasporic thought. However, this position holds firm to the idea that living in the Land of Israel is a commandment from the Torah. For the moment we will leave aside the conclusions to be reached from this idea.

Position 2

Rabbi Yosef next addresses the argument proposed in Megillat Ester, a commentary on the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvot, by Rabbi Isaac de Leon, which maintains that the obligation to live in Eretz Yisrael is no longer in force since the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash. For this reason, states Rabbi de Leon, the Rambam did not include the commandment to live in Eretz Yisrael in his Sefer HaMitzvot. Ketuvot 111a in the gemara is read, according to Megillat Ester, when it interprets Shir HaShirim 2:7, as a warning not to rebel against the conquerors of Israel or to take the Land by force. This gemara is an often cited reason of the rejectionist "ultra-orthodox" for extricating the commandment of living in the Land of Israel from the Torah for all generations under the divinely ordained yoke of exile. The gemara, therefore, warrants full citation of appropriate sections and comment.

Talmud Bavli, Ketuvot 111a, says:

They shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until the day that I remember them, saith the L-rd ( Jer. 27:22). And R. Zera? -- That text, it is written, to the vessels of the ministry. And Rav Yehuda? -- Another text is also is written: I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, [that you awaken not, nor stir up love (for the Land of Israel), until it please] (Shir HaShirim 2:7). And R. Zera? -- That implies that Israel shall not go up [as a people as if surrounded] by a wall. And Rav Yehuda? -- Another I adjure you (Shir HaShirim 3:5) is written in Scripture. And R. Zera? -- That text is required for [an exposition] like that of R. Yose son of R. Hanina who said: 'What was the purpose of those three adjurations? [the two previous citations plus Shir HaShirim 5:8] -- One, that Israel shall not go up [as a people as if surrounded] by a wall; the second, that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured the gentile nations that they shall not oppress Israel excessively.'

Rabbi Yosef rejects this analysis of Maimonides' position on the halakhic issue because (a) Maimonides includes in his enumeration of the 613 commandments such precepts as the rebuilding of the Temple, which in Maimonides' own opinion are not operative prior to [sic] the Messianic era [Maimonides does not require the actual personage of the Messiah to usher in the Messianic era. Maimonides also does not require the mitzva of rebuilding the Temple to wait for the Messiah. See Yad Hazaka, Sefer Shoftim, Hilkhot Melakhim U'Milhamoteihem, viz. Halakhot 2 and 3; Hilkhot Beit HaBehira.], and (b) none of the numerous statements contained in the talmudic and midrashic works supporting the view that settlement in Israel is a positive commandment in any way intimates that this commandment may be binding only in certain epochs. Of particular note is the statement in B'reshit Rabba LXXVI, explaining the reasons for Jacob's fear that he might be vanquished in battle by Esau. Jacob's foreboding was based on the fact the Esau had acquired greater merit by virtue of having dwelt in Eretz Yisrael uninterruptedly throughout the years spent by Jacob in the house of Laban. In addition to the counter arguments set forth by Rabbi Yosef, it is difficult to understand how one interprets a Midrashic/Aggadic statement literally. It is more difficult to imagine utilizing a literally interpreted Midrash to establish a halakhic norm contradicting an explicit commandment in the Tanakh. The gemara that follows speaks directly to the merit of living in the Land and makes no reference to the fact that the Jewish people are barred from reestablishing a national entity. The weight of opposing evidence draws out the difficulty in interpreting the lines from Shir HaShirim as a literal ban on Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel. The idea that generations of Jews are excused from performing what G-d has deemed as the way of life for mankind is an intolerable notion that rejects the very foundations of Torah thought. Lastly, were we to take this interpretation as a punishment from G-d, we would have to ask if the gentile nations have not "broken" the "agreement" by oppressing the Jewish people in most barbarous ways for the nearly 2000 years of exile. When all is said and done, the very idea that a removal of over one-third of the Torah requirements (without the Land) could be a permissible understanding of Torah is ludicrous. A word ought to be said about Rabbi Yosef's interpretation of the Rambam's statement that one of the proofs of the Messiah will be that he will build the Beit HaMikdash. The Rambam's statement does not mean that he will literally built it, but rather that he will either see it completed (i.e., place the mezuza on the doorpost or place a missing element of the structure in order) or that he will give proper instruction to its use once it is built (which could be before his coming). This is not a commandment based solely on the arrival of the Messiah for the obligation to build the Beit HaMikdash is clearly stated as an obligation of all generations and has no restriction based upon the arrival of the Messiah as was the case with the building of the Second Beit HaMikdash.

Position 3

Rabbi Yosef discusses the opinion of the Rashbam, who, while commenting on Bava Batra 91a, holds that while living in the Land is not specifically a positive injunction, it is nevertheless forbidden to leave Eretz Yisrael other than in times of great economic distress. The Rashbam maintained that living in the Land was, in the words of Rabbi Bleich, "a preparatory step to the fulfillment of commandments (hekhsher mitzvot), there being numerous commandments which can be fulfilled only in Israel." The opinion that living in the Land has some "pre-commandment" nature to it will be discussed later in this work.

Position 4

This position states that there can be halakhic reasons to negate the doing of the Law. In a commentary to the gemara Ketuvot 110b a concept is put forth in which the dangers involved with fulfilling the commandments regarding the Land of Israel are too extreme and pose a danger to life sufficient enough to preclude the performance of the mitzvot. Rabbi Yosef questions the authenticity of Tosafot, Ketuvot 110b, attributed to Rabbenu Chaim Kohen. It states that there is no obligation to live in the Land due to the hardships associated with observing the mitzvot tied to the Land of Israel. Additionally, the statement itself does not negate the fact that dwelling in the land does constitute a positive commandment only that there might be overriding halakhic reasons not to fulfill the mitzva of dwelling in the land. If this position can be substantiated through the halakhic process then it would stand to reason that should those reasons be overcome in the present time, there would be no impediment to once again recognize the need to perform this commandment. Hardships, meaning immanent death, if it ever applied, does not now. There is no greater threat to life in the Land of Israel than there is in New York City, Moscow or London. The idea that there is greater chance of spiritual death, of one's removal from Judaism, in the exile is substantiated by the figures pertaining to assimilation and intermarriage.

Position 5

Rabbi Yosef pointedly argues with Rabbi Moshe Feinstein's opinion as stated in Iggrot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer, 1, no. 102. Rabbi Feinstein asserts that there exists two separate "categories of positive commandments. There are precepts whose performance is mandatory, e.g., circumcision, the donning of phylacteries, etc., and others which are not mandated as obligatory responsibilities but nevertheless, when indeed performed, constitute the fulfillment of a commandment." [Bleich p.7] As has already been stated, Rabbi Yosef interprets the Ramban very differently and therefore the nature of the obligation of dwelling in the land.

It is troubling to use the words of Reb Moshe, z"l, in what ultimately amounts to the destruction of Jewish thought. How is it possible that Judaism understands the actions of man in such a distorted manner? The answer, of course, is that it does not. Judaism can no more qualify the doing of an action as a mitzva only after it is done than it can separate the required activity of a Jew from his "extra" activity and then deem it (i.e., the "extra" activity) as meritorious. The logical conclusions to such thought are frightening at best and otherwise distorted.

It is worth a moment to address the position of Reb Moshe, z"l on this topic. A full analysis would require an examination of the foundations on which Rabbi Feinstein, z"l, has built his opinion and then the extraction, to what ever extent that is possible, of the resultant dilemmas that his view might present. Our purpose at the moment, however, is only to draw out some ideas maintained by Maimonides on the same general theme. It is our hope that what is said below will demonstrate how the statements made in the previous paragraph were essentially conceived.

The mishna Avot [3:18] attributes to Rabbi Akiva the following statement:

Everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice has been given. The world is judged according to the good, and everything depends on the majority of what has been done.

Maimonides comments: This saying comprises facts of the utmost importance and is worthy of Rabbi Akiva. The following is a short explanation which assumes familiarity with the preceding chapters: Everything in the world is known to G-d and under His control. This is expressed "Everything is foreseen." Then he continues, you should not think that since all actions are already known, they are necessarily fixed beyond control, i.e., that man is forced to act in a particular way. This is not so, but man has free will to do as he pleases. This is expressed "yet freedom is given," i.e., everybody has a free will, as explained in Shemona Perakim [the Rambam's introductory essay to this mesekhet].

In Shemona Perakim Maimonides writes:

The statement found in the saying of the Rabbis, 'All is in the power of G-d except the fear of G-d' [Rabbi Hanina: B'rakhot 33b; Nidda 16b; Megilla 25a] is, nevertheless, true, and in accord with what we have laid down here. Men are, however, very often prone to err in supposing that many of their actions, in reality the result of their own free will, are forced upon them, as for instance, marrying a certain woman, or acquiring a certain amount of money. Such superstition is untrue. If a man espouses and marries a woman legally, then she becomes his lawful wife, and by his marrying her he has fulfilled the divine command to increase and multiply. G-d, however, does not decree the fulfillment of a commandment. If, on the other hand, a man has consummated with a woman an unlawful marriage, he has committed a transgression. But G-d does not decree that a man shall sin. Again, suppose a man robs another of money, steals from him, or cheats him, and then uttering a false oath, denies it; if we should say that G-d has destined that this sum should pass into the hands of the one out of the possession of the other, G-d would be preordaining an act of iniquity. Such, however, is not the case, but rather that all of man's actions, which are subject to his free will, undoubtedly either comply with, or transgress, G-d's commands; for, as has been explained in Chapter II, the commands and prohibitions of the Law refer only to those actions with regard to which man has absolute free choice to do, or refrain from doing. Moreover, to this faculty of the soul (i.e., the freedom of the will) "the fear of G-d" is subservient, and is, in consequence, not predestined by G-d, but, as we have explained, is entirely in the power of the human free will. By the word 'all', the Rabbis meant to designate only the natural phenomena which are not influenced by the will of man, as whether a person is tall or short, whether it is rainy or dry, whether the air is pure or impure, and all other such things that happen in the world, and which have no connection with man's conduct.

Yet another rationalization proffered by those in the Diaspora for their failure to reside in the Land rests upon the distinction between men and women and the obligation to conquer the Land. In his analysis Rabbi Bleich notes a comment of Rabbenu Nissim, Ketuvot 110b, T'shuvot Rashbash, no. 2, and Maharit, II, no. 28, which makes the point that there is no distinction between men and women regarding the fulfillment of the mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael.

Talmud Bavli, Ketuvot, 110b,

Our Rabbis taught: If [the husband] desires to go up [to the Land of Israel] and his wife refuses she must be pressed to go up; and if [she does] not [consent] she may be divorced without a ketuba. If she desires to go up [to the Land of Israel] and he refuses, he must be pressed to go up; and if [he does] not [consent] he must divorce her and pay her ketuba. If she desires to leave [the Land of Israel] and he refuses to leave [the Land of Israel], she must be pressed not to leave, and if [pressure is of] no [avail] she may be divorced without a ketuba. If he desires to leave [the Land of Israel] and she refuses he must be pressed not to leave, and if [coercion is of] no [avail] he must divorce her and pay her ketuba.

It is further stated that the commandment of living in Eretz Yisrael entails not only inhabiting the country but also possessing the Land by ruling over it and acquiring territory. Bleich continues that "Rashbaz views these tasks [the latter two] as being male prerogatives and rules that women are exempt from this commandment." [Bleich p.12] What Rabbi Bleich neglects to insert plainly and clearly is that the obligation to dwell in the Land is assumed without question.

This brings us to the Rambam and what appears to be his exclusion of living in Eretz Yisrael as a positive commandment. It is clear that the Rambam made certain assumptions regarding the human condition, that is, what comes natural to man. By nature, man is a political being. He is, from a Torah perspective, a social creature whose fundamental need is to associate with his fellow man. This once understood, and taking into account the nature of the halakha derived by Maimonides from the sources, it must be understood that a national existence is an assumed state of being for man. That the Jew has his own set of codes, laws, and customs is part and parcel of the will of G-d. That the Jew should exist as a separate entity, apart from all other nations, is also the will of G-d. That the Jew is to exist separately with his own codes, laws, and customs in a national setting is a given. It is as if the Rambam would have been forced to explain that in order for a man to don t'fillin at morning prayer, he would first be required to wake from his sleep. It is only natural that man be awake at morning prayer and at the time of wearing the t'fillin; therefore, it is superfluous to state as much. Likewise, the natural state of man requires that he live within a society of men with similar ends. To state that the Jewish people must fulfill, what from all religious and rational perspectives seem obvious, would be a waste of words and a corruption of the concept of Mitzva. [The Rambam is most careful not to waste words or dilute ideas. For a better idea of his position see More Nevukhim, Introduction to Treatise.] We realize that without waking in the morning no mitzvot can be performed, so to, must we understand that without a Jewish national existence the will of Hashem remains unfulfilled, as well as a majority of the Taryag Mitzvot.

The state, from the position of the Rambam, is very much akin to the tools of the sculptor. It is there to mold the character of the Jewish people, to formulate the correct set of guidelines for each generation, all within the primary notions of Torah. Without the commonwealth there can be no Jewish existence.

It is not paradoxical that the Rambam should set as law that the Jew is to live among the idol worshippers if it be in Eretz Yisrael rather than with Jews in Galut. We are told to override the halakha in Hilkhot De'ot, Perek Vav, Halakha Alef (cited above) in order to fulfill the halakha of dwelling in the Land. Know that Maimonides is resolute in his position that a Jewish polity is a given, an assumed presupposition for the actualization of Torah Law.
   

Rabbi Bleich reexamines many of the same issues from another perspective in the second volume of Contemporary Halakhic Problems. While discussing the status of Yehuda and Shomron in chapter 9, page 189-190, of his book, Rabbi Bleich makes the following point regarding the central nature of the Land from the perspective of the Torah:

The claim of the community of Israel to the Land of Israel in its entirety as its historic homeland is predicated upon G-d's covenant with Abraham (Genesis 15:7-21). However, with regard to three specific geographical areas -- the Cave of Makhpela, the Temple Mount, and Shekhem -- title to the land is based upon more conventional grounds. These particular sites are described in Scripture as having become the property of our ancestors by right of purchase long before they acquired title to the rest of the Land of Canaan. The uniqueness of these areas is underscored by the sages of the Midrash (B'reshit Rabba 79:7). Why implied, queries the Midrash, is the narrative concerning Abraham's purchase of the sepulcher in the field of Makhpela spelled out in such minute detail (Genesis 23:3-17)? Why does the Bible so carefully identify the individual from whom David purchased the Temple Mount (II Samuel 24:18-25)? 

Why does the Torah relate that Jacob pitched his tent for the sum of 100 kesita (Genesis 33:19)? Answers the Midrash: 'So that the nations of the world will not be able to taunt Israel saying, "These [lands] are in your possession by virtue of theft."' These historical facts are recorded for a specific purpose, viz., so that for all posterity the gentile nations will never be in the position of being able to taunt the community of Israel with the claim that Israel lacks clear title to those historic sites.

Rabbi Bleich continues on page 191:

An incisive observation regarding Abraham's purchase of this site is attributed to Rabbi Samuel Molhiever, one of the foremost exponents of religious Zionism. In purchasing this parcel of land for use as a burial place Abraham paid more that the fair market value. The land, according to rabbinic sources, was not at all worth the 400 shekalim of highest quality silver which Abraham paid. R. Samuel Molhiever remarked, 'The Torah here teaches us a lesson of great significance. The Torah emphasizes that there is no price that is too high even for the smallest portion of the Land of Israel.' Indeed, there is no price that is too high, not only assessed in shekalim and kesita, or dollars and lira, but even in terms of the emotional coin which a Jew is, at times, called upon to pay.

In the same vein is Rashi's commentary on B'reshit, concerning the very first pasuk. He cites Rabbi Yitzhak as follows:

It was not necessary to begin the Torah, [whose main objective is to teach commandments and mitzvot, with this verse] but from This month shall be unto you the [beginning of months] [Sh'mot 12:2], since this is the first mitzva that Israel was commanded. And what is the reason that this begins with B'reshit? Because of [the verse] The power of His works He hath declared to His people in giving them the heritage of the nations [Tehillim 111:6]. For if the nations of the world should say to Israel: 'You are robbers, because you have seized by force the lands of the seven nations' they [Israel] could say to them, 'The entire world belongs to the Holy One, Blessed Be He, He created it and gave it to whomever it was right in His eyes. Of His own will He took it from them and gave it to us.' [Yalkut, Sh'mot 12:2]

Finally, a section of Tanakh -- Tehillim 105:44-45 states:

And He gave them the lands of the nations and the labor of the people did they inherit. That they might keep His statutes and observe His laws.

If indeed these are the facts, if Jewish thought rests upon the validity of the Torah being true, then the halakhic decisions derived must conform to these truths. Why cannot a Jewish polity be formed in Lithuania or Brooklyn?

Simply put, G-d give the Jewish people a place and that place is the Land of Israel. The question of why the Land of Israel is thus answered. If a Jew is to accept one tenant of the Torah, he must, in order to be logically consistent, accept the whole of Torah. Likewise, if a person is to accept that he is Jewish then he must define this concept upon viable and authentic Jewish sources and render precise his own actions accordingly. Any other alternative to this is something other than Judaism. That is, a person may, given free-will, live according to what is right in his own eyes, however, he must be rationally forced to understand that it is of his own devise and should be so called as such. 

The only rational conclusion, the only Jewish conclusion, to what has been said is that which we have stated above, viz., that the notion of Jewish national existence is intrinsic to all Jewish thought and practice from both a halakhic point of view and a philosophic perspective. Despite this fact and given the preponderance of evidence brought down by Rabbi Bleich, he and the rabbis that share his opinion, have chosen to remain outside of the understanding of these sublime notions. This is indeed further proof of the damage wrought not only by living outside the Land, but what two millennia without a Jewish nation has brought into the confines of accepted halakhic thought. The choice to exercise the moral obligation consists in endowing the necessary instruments with the power to educate and to build a Jewish nation.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, stressed:

Without Torah there is no civic order, and without civic order there is no Torah. Without wisdom there is no fear of G-d, and without fear of G-d there is no wisdom. Without knowledge there is no intelligence, and without intelligence there is no knowledge. Without food there is no Torah, and without Torah there is no food. [Mishna Avot 3:20]

The idea here is that each component of these pairs helps create and completes its counterpart. The example of knowledge and intelligence, however, is a very delicate problem of philosophy. I mention it, relying on the understanding of those who take up this problem. The knowledge which comes to us and which we acquire, in turn, lets us understand the reasons to which it leads, if the whole idea is analyzed in detail and understood, or we can understand the separate reasons in their essence without applying them as knowledge. But the reasons themselves constitute essentially items of knowledge. This understanding is called intelligence, and it constitutes knowledge in itself, while knowledge is a medium for intelligence in that it makes it possible for us to understand whatever we do understand. It is like saying that if we do not understand the reason, we do not have real knowledge, while, if we have no knowledge, we do not understand the reason, because we understand it only based on our knowledge. To understand this idea is very difficult, even from the books written specially on this subject, all the more from this short passage. We only intended to point out the right path. [Rambam's Commentary on the Mishna]The right path is a knowledge of the whole of intelligence that makes up Torah so that it may be applied through intelligence as knowledge and not as intelligence through knowledge or knowing of it. Torah is a closed system of practical application while at the same time an open ended gateway of knowledge. To choose the right path is to understand this duality as a human misconception of a single divine idea.